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A recent decision by the Washington State Supreme Court,
Miotke v. City of Spokane,1 may broadly affect the right to and
type of recovery that will be available to persons whose property
rights are infringed either by an agent of the state or by private
parties.2 Miotke involved the dumping of untreated sewage into
a river, with the sewage flowing into a lake and interfering with
lakefront property owners' enjoyment of their property. The
court in Miotke faced a set of claims in property, tort, and state
environmental law. The court recognized the significance of its
decision and the novel issues before it,' yet the opinion left
important questions unanswered and raised new ones.4
The Miotke court faced several important issues in this
admittedly complex case.' First, when should a unit of state gov-
ernment be held liable for certain conduct under a tort theory
rather than under an eminent domain theory?" Second, when
liability is based upon tort, can a common law tort provide in
1. 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
2. Although the court's distinction between nuisance and eminent domain is impor-
tant only in situations where a government entity is the defendant, the court's general
application of nuisance law is applicable to private defendants. See infra notes 108-12.
3. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 309, 678 P.2d at 805 ("This case raises a plethora of
issues, many of them novel, at least in this jurisdiction.").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86, 117-23 and 124-35.
5. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 311, 678 P.2d at 806.
6. "Concededly the distinction between a constitutional taking and damaging and
tortious conduct by the state or one of its subdivisions is not always clear." Olsen v. King
County, 71 Wash. 2d 279, 284, 428 P.2d 562, 567 (1967). See also Comment, Distinguish-
ing Eminent Domain From Police Power & Tort, 38 WASH. L. REv. 607, 619-25 (1963).
The opinion did not address the defendants' argument that the governments' conduct
was a noncompensable exercise of police power. Brief for Appellant City of Spokane at
33-36, Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
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essence a private right of action for the violation of certain envi-
ronmental laws that themselves provide no express right of
action? 7 Finally, are injured parties entitled to additional dam-
ages based upon a "novel theory" of tort recovery for the viola-
tion of one's "fundamental right" to a healthful environment as
guaranteed by the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)? 9
The Miotke court's resolution, or lack thereof, of each of these
issues is likely to have far reaching effects, some of them per-
haps unintended.
This Note addresses the Miotke court's choice of a statutory
nuisance remedy over a constitutionally-based eminent domain
theory. In addition, this Note addresses the court's potentially
significant denial of additional SEPA-based damages, but sug-
gests that the court may in the future use this SEPA-based the-
ory to provide tort recovery.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In 1973, the Washington State Department of Ecology
(DOE) ordered the City of Spokane to embark on a plan to
modernize its waste treatment plant and complete the project by
June 30, 1976. In an attempt to comply with the order, the City
planned to increase the waste system's capacity and add second-
ary sewage treatment to meet state water quality standards.10
After completing the planning and financing arrangements," the
City obtained preliminary regulatory approvals from the DOE
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2
7. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 330, 678 P.2d at 816.
8. Id. at 333, 678 P.2d at 817.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1985).
10. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 312, 678 P.2d at 807. On March 28, 1973, the DOE gave
the City of Spokane until June 30, 1976, to modify its sewage treatment plant to improve
the water quality of the Spokane River and Long Lake. The agency had determined that
the sewage disposal caused both the lake and river to fail to meet the state regulatory
water quality standards as established in WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 173-201-070(4) and 173-
201-080(105) (1983).
11. Seventy-five percent of the funding for the new plant was provided by a grant
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d
at 312-13, 678 P.2d at 807.
12. When participating in a project receiving federal grant funds, a municipality
must prepare an Environmental Assessment Statement pursuant to the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (1977). In Washington, the
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) requires that local public bodies take
identical environmental review action prior to proceeding on major actions that will sig-
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During the period from January to October, 1974, the EPA
and the DOE considered the City's plans and the project's
potential environmental impact. In October of 1974, both the
DOE and the EPA gave final approval to the plans and specifi-
cations,1" subject to several conditions. One of these conditions
required the City to apply for a new permit if facility expansion
required increased discharge.14 Construction began immediately.
In September, 1975, construction reached the anticipated point
where further work would interfere with the normal operation of
the existing sewage treatment plant. The City sought approval
from the DOE to bypass the plant temporarily by discharging
nificantly affect the quality of the environment. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1985).
An assessment completed pursuant to NEPA need not be repeated to meet the SEPA
requirements. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.150 (1985).
13. The court summarized the environmental assessment process as it pertained to
this case as follows:
A draft statement was prepared in June 1973, public hearings were con-
ducted in July 1973, and the final environmental assessment was submitted to
the EPA and DOE in September 1973. The final assessment recognized that
the treatment plant might have to be bypassed during reconstruction of the
headworks of the treatment plant, but declared that such a bypass would occur
during maximum high water, when the assimilative capacity of the river is at
its peak.
On January 2, 1974, the City of Spokane filed with the EPA and the DOE
a declaration that the sewage plant modification was not a 'major action signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the environment.' The EPA issued its negative
declaration on June 10, 1974.
The next step was the granting of a Waste Discharge Permit. The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Pub. L. No. 92-500, 2, 86
Stat. 880 (1972)), 33 U.S.C. 1342 (1976 & Supp. 4, 1981) created the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) waste discharge permit pro-
gram. Under this program, the EPA has authority to issue permits allowing the
discharge of pollutants into federal waters. In 1973, the EPA delegated author-
ity to the DOE to administer the NPDES program in this state. Regulations
pertaining to the administration of this permit program were adopted by the
DOE in September 1973, and are contained in WAC 173-220.
In November 1973, the City of Spokane submitted an application to dis-
charge pollutants into the waters of the United States. RCW 90.48.162. After
public notice and a hearing, the permit was granted on October 25, 1974.
NPDES Waste Discharge Permit WA-002447-3.
Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 313-14, 678 P.2d at 807.
14. The general discharge permit contained several requirements, including that (1)
the average effluent discharge not exceed 35 million gallons per day; (2) maintenance
records be kept on any total or partial bypass; (3) a new National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit be issued whenever a facility expansion required
increased discharge. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 313-14, 678 P.2d at 807.
In September 1974, the City submitted a complete set of plans for the facility
expansion. In January of 1975, both the DOE and the EPA approved the plans and
specifications in their entirety. The City did not apply for a new permit, and the DOE
did not issue one. Id. at 314, 678 P.2d at 807.
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raw sewage directly into the Spokane River. 15  The DOE
reviewed and rejected the City's other available options'6 and
conditionally authorized the bypass. The DOE proceeded under
the mistaken belief that it had the regulatory authority to
authorize the bypass without following the procedural require-
ment for issuing a new waste discharge permit. The DOE appar-
ently determined that it could avoid requiring a new permit by
simply lowering the water quality standards in the waters receiv-
ing the discharges. 17
During the three and one-half days of the bypass, the City
diverted over 100 million gallons of untreated sewage into the
river. 8 The sewage flowed down river until reaching the first
dam and the artificial lake behind it, Long Lake. Property own-
ers along the lake began litigation immediately.1 9 The trial court
found that the bypass resulted in the denial of the plaintiffs' use
and enjoyment of the lakefront property from October 5, 1975,
15. Id. at 313-14, 678 P.2d at 807-08. The final environmental assessment submitted
to the EPA and DOE in September, 1973, recognized that the bypass might be necessary
during reconstruction of the plant, but the plan contemplated that any bypass would
take place during a maximum high water period when it would have a lesser effect on
water quality.
16. Id. at 314-15, 678 P.2d at 808. On September 25, 1975, the DOE met with the
City and their consultants, Bovey Engineers, to discuss the alternatives. They were: (1)
storage of raw sewage until work was completed, (2) screening and chlorination of the
sewage prior to discharge, (3) performance of the work while the plant was under opera-
tion, and (4) delay of the work until a higher river flow period in the spring. City officials
held a press conference where they explained the nature of the diversion and its impact.
Id. at 315, 678 P.2d at 808.
17. The DOE issued order DE 75-184 pursuant to WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 173-201,
(1983) which temporarily lowered the water quality standards. One of the major issues in
the case was whether the DOE order alone was sufficient to allow the city to engage in
the bypass. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 327, 678 P.2d at 808.
18. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 315, 678 P.2d at 808. (The figure is based upon DOE
estimates.).
19. The plaintiffs, who were lakefront property owners, filed two lawsuits only days
after the bypass. They filed the first suit in Stevens County seeking a permanent injunc-
tion against both defendants and a declaratory judgment challenging the legality of the
bypass. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 315-16, 678 P.2d at 808-09. The second action was filed
in Spokane County, in which the plaintiffs sought (1) an injunction against further
bypasses; (2) a declaration that the October bypass was tortious for failure to file an
Environmental Impact Statement, failure to obtain a new waste disposal permit, and
failure to comply with the general waste disposal permit; (3) damages, under theories of
negligence, nuisance, inverse condemnation, strict liability, and statutory theories; and
(4) costs and attorney fees. Under stipulation, the Stevens County action was removed
and joined with the Spokane County suit. The common law causes of action were
dropped, but later claims for trespass, private nuisance, and strict liability were added
back from the Stevens County action. Id.
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through part of 1977 and to some extent into 1978.20 In addition
to requesting injunctive relief,2 the plaintiffs sought damages
under several theories.2 2 In an attempt to limit their potential
liability the City and State contended that damages were availa-
ble only under an inverse condemnation theory.23
The trial court granted most of the plaintiffs' claims for
damages.2" In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the
defendants violated five environmental statutes: the State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA),25 the Water Pollution
Control Act (WPCA)2e, the Pollution Disclosure Act of 1971
(PDA),27 the Water Resources Act of 1971 (WRA),2 e and the
20. The Washington Supreme Court quoted the trial court, finding that:
"The [e]ffiuents discharged during the October 1975 Bypass contained,
inter alia, human excreta, wastes, and offal, filth and decomposing matter,
floating solids like fecal matter, toilet paper particles and prophylactics, etc.,
all of which was visible to the eye as slimy slicks, discoloration, plumes and
aggregations of pollution which was offensive and repulsive to the senses of
ordinary persons of normal sensitivity, and all of which produced rancid, nox-
ious, as well as repulsive odors and stenches offensive to the sense of smell of
ordinary persons of normal sensitivity, and which resulted in polluted and con-
taminated unhealthy waters .
Id. at 317, 678 P.2d at 809.
21. On January 31, 1977, the trial court issued an injunction barring future bypasses
of untreated sewage into the Spokane River. Id.
22. The plaintiffs claimed six categories of damages:
1. Damages for tortious violation of the State Environmental Policy Act
2. Damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
3. Damages for loss of riparian rights
4. Damages for loss of enjoyment
5. Out-of-pocket expenses
6. Attorneys' fees and costs
Id. at 318, 678 P.2d at 810.
23. Id. The defendants apparently assumed that eminent domain would limit recov-
ery to the diminished value of the property. Contra Highline School Dist. No. 401 v. Port
of Seattle, 87 Wash. 2d 6, 13 n.5, 548 P.2d 1085, 1090 n.5 (1976) (suggesting that recov-
ery under eminent domain theory should provide full and fair compensation for loss of
property rights and should not be limited to a restrictive market value analysis).
24. The court granted damages for the denial of use and enjoyment of the defend-
ants' properties and lifestyle and for negligent infliction of emotional distress but denied
plaintiffs' claims for damages and out-of-pocket expenses based upon the SEPA pream-
ble. Miotke, 101 Wash.2d at 320, 678 P.2d at 811.
25. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 43.21 (1985). The trial court ruled that the DOE and the
City violated SEPA in several ways, including insufficient environmental assessments in
June and August of 1973 and a failure to conduct a full environmental review before
approving the bypass in October of 1975. Brief for Appellant City of Spokane at A-6,
Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
26. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 90.48 (1985).
27. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.52 (1985).
28. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 90.54 (1985).
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Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA). 29 Although the spe-
cific computational basis for the award is unclear,30 the court
granted a total of $245,000 in damages. In addition to the dam-
ages award, the trial court awarded attorney's fees. 1
B. Issues and Holding
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court addressed
several issues, explicitly and implicitly. The court identified the
most important issues as "whether any cause of action lies
against governmental units for injuries allegedly caused by their
actions taken in violation of various environmental laws," 32 and
if so, under what theory such action should lie. 3 The court
determined that governmental units are liable for damage
caused by their violation of environmental laws, and that this
liability arose under Washington's nuisance statute3 4 rather than
under an inverse condemnation theory. 3
In deciding that the plaintiffs' cause of action arose from
nuisance rather than eminent domain law, the court applied
29. WASH. Rav. CODE ch. 90.58 (1985). The trial court found that the City violated
the act by "(1) failing to control pollution and prevent damages to the natural environ-
ment and (2) failing to minimize insofar as practical any resultant damage to the ecology
and environment of the shoreline areas of the state of Washington and interference with
the peoples' use of the waters." Brief for Appellant City of Spokane at A-6, Miotke, 101
Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
30. In determining the damage award, the trial court took notice of the project's
ultimate benefit to the plaintiffs, but did not indicate how much this fact reduced the
award of damages. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 320, 678 P.2d at 811.
31. The trial court granted attorney fees based on equitable grounds in connection
with the injunction phase of the litigation. It was the trial court's opinion that the
injunction performed a substantial public benefit. Id. For a review of the equitable
grounds upon which an award of attorney fees may be made, see PUD v. Kottsick, 86
Wash. 2d 388, 545 P.2d 1 (1976).
32. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 309, 678 P.2d at 805.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 331, 678 P.2d at 816-17.
35. Id.; The terms eminent domain and inverse condemnation are interchangable
because they refer to the same legal theory. They are, in essence, different sides of the
same coin. It has been said,
Eminent domain is defined generally as the power of the nation or state,
or authorized public agency, to take or to authorize the taking of private prop-
erty for a public use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon the pay-
ment of just compensation. . . .Inverse condemnation has been characterized
as an action or eminent domain proceeding initiated by the property owner
rather than the condemnor, and has been deemed to be available where private
property has been actually taken [or damaged] for public use without formal
condemnation proceedings. ...
Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 612, 254 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1977)).
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what can be called a "permanence of the interference" test.36
Under the test, if the damage is permanent or long term, then
the interference constitutes inverse condemnation, but if the
injury is only temporary, the interference is tortious Applying
this test to the Miotke facts, the court had no alternative but to
find that the interference was temporary and that nuisance law
controlled because the sewage had dissipated and the water had
cleared long before the case reached the court.3 8
In analyzing the case under the nuisance statutes, however,
the court may have modified its traditional analysis. The court
apparently read the statutes 9 to permit recovery when a plain-
tiff shows only that (1) the defendant "unlawfully [did] any
act,"'40 and (2) that act "essentially interfer[ed] with the com-
fortable enjoyment of the life and property" of the plaintiffs.41
This test appears to ignore a traditional consideration of nui-
sance analysis: the reasonableness of the interference.42
The court easily found the City and State liable under the
36. Id. at 334, 678 P.2d at 818. See also Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., 40 Wash. App.
802, 816, 701 P.2d 518, 527 (1985) (suggesting that planned action was necessary in addi-
tion to permanent interference).
37. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 334, 678 P.2d at 818.
38. Id. at 319, 678 P.2d at 810.
39. The court, in finding a nuisance, read two of Washington's nuisance statutes
together. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120 (1985) provides:
Nuisance consists of unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a
duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort,
repose, health or safety of others, offends decency, or unlawfully interferes
with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or render dangerous for passage, any lake
or navigable river, bay, stream, canal or basin or any public park, square, street
or highway; or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use
of property.
(emphasis added). WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.010 (1985) provides:
The obstruction of any highway or the closing of the channel of any
stream used for boating or rafting logs, lumber or timber, or whatever is injuri-
ous to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of the life and property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for
damages and other and further relief.
40. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.120 (1985).
41. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.010 (1985).
42. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 319, 678 P.2d at 810. Although in its recital of the trial
court findings the court acknowledged that the trial court found unreasonable interfer-
ence, nowhere in the discussion of nuisance liability did the Miotke court consider the
reasonableness of the interference. Certainly, the defendants could validly argue that the
public interest reasons for adding secondary treatment under the adopted schedule out-
weighed the potential short-term injury to the plaintiffs, especially since the plaintiffs, as
property owners on or near the river, would be particularly benefited in the long-run by
the cleaner river water.
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posed nuisance test. First, the "unlawful act '"4  requirement was
satisfied by the defendants' violation of the waste discharge per-
mit.4 4 Second, the "interference with property" portion of the
test was satisfied by the interruption in the plaintiffs' full use
and enjoyment of their lakefront properties and lifestyle.45
After finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of
proving these two nuisance requirements, the court faced two
other statutory hurdles. First, the court had to determine
whether the nuisance was public or private .4 The court held
that the nuisance was public in nature,' 7 but a remedy nonethe-
less was available because the plaintiffs were especially injured.4"
Second, the court had to address the statutory defense that
nothing done or maintained under the express authority of a
statute can be deemed a nuisance.49 The defendants' actions, the
court held, were not protected by this provision because the
dumping was a wrongful act in violation of a statute.50
In the past, the court has liberally construed the statutory
nuisance defense to the benefit of government entities who act
under broad statutory authority as in Miotke.51 But the court
43. See supra note 40.
44. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 329, 678 P.2d at 815.
45. Id. at 331, 678 P.2d at 817.
46. Id. A public nuisance is "one which affects equally the right of an entire commu-
nity or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage may be unequal." WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.48.130 (1985).
47. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 331, 678 P.2d at 817.
48. Id. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.160 (1985) provides: "Nothing which is done or
maintained under express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance." WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.48.210 (1985), (a private person may maintain a civil action for a public nui-
sance if it is specially injurious to himself but not otherwise and ownership of the prop-
erty interfered with is sufficient to meet the special injury requirement). See Park v.
Stolzheise, 24 Wash. 2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946) (holding that a diminution in property
value caused by a zoning violation is sufficient to constitute special injury); Anderson v.
Nichols, 152 Wash. 315, 278 P. 161 (1929) (where city permitted abutting landowner to
erect building on street for private gain, the surrounding abutting owners suffered added
inconvenience by being denied free access to their property, and sustained special
injury); Ingersoll v. Rousseau, 35 Wash. 92, 76 P. 513 (1904) (finding a special injury
where neighbor was compelled to witness indecent conduct of the residents of a house of
prostitution and to listen to the loud, boisterous, and indecent noises made by them).
49. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 331, 678 P.2d at 817.
50. The court reasoned that the dumping could not have been "under the express
authorization of a statute" if it in fact was in violation of both WASH. REv. CODE ch. 90.48
(1985) and the nuisance statute itself, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120 (1985). Miotke, 101
Wash. 2d at 331, 678 P.2d at 817.
51. The City had statutory authority to construct and operate a municipal sewage
collection and treatment system. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.67.020 (1985). For examples of
the liberal application of the statutory nuisance defense, see Deaconess Hospital v.
[Vol. 9:539
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reasoned that this statute could not shelter the defendants' con-
duct in Miotke because there was a blatant violation of law.2
After this issue was resolved in the plaintiffs' favor, their burden
under the nuisance statute was met.
In addition to analyzing the case under inverse condemna-
tion and nuisance theory, the court examined the plaintiffs'
claim for additional damages premised upon a SEPA-based tort
theory. The court denied the claim, at least in part because ade-
quate damages were available under "established theories. '' 3
III. NUISANCE OR INVERSE CONDEMNATION?
A. Background
The Washington courts have long struggled to distinguish
cases of inverse condemnation from those of tortious conduct
but have never adequately resolved the conflict." The test that
courts have previously used but that was ignored in Miotke55
distinguished inverse condemnation from nuisance based on
whether the injury was necessary to the operation or mainte-
nance of some property devoted to public use.5 6 If the infringe-
Washington State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wash. 2d 378, 408, 403 P.2d 54, 72 (1965) (con-
struction of a highway under general statutory authority to engage in such activities pre-
vented a proposed highway from being held a nuisance); Carlson v. City of Wenatchee,
56 Wash. 2d 932, 935-36, 350 P.2d 457, 460 (1960) (general statutory authority of a
municipality to place and maintain traffic devices prevented a finding that a particular
traffic control box constituted a nuisance); Judd v. Bernhard, 49 Wash. 2d 619, 621, 304
P.2d 1046, 1048 (1956) (express legislative authorization to a game director to engage in
fish kills prevented that activity from being termed a nuisance); Mola v. Metropolitan
Park Dist., 181 Wash. 177, 181, 42 P.2d 435, 437 (1935) (the general statutory authority
of a park district to obtain and hold property was sufficient to prevent a finding that a
park bathing pool was a nuisance); Aubol v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 455, 9 P.2d
780, 781 (1932) (plaintiffs owning property in the shadow of a legislatively authorized
dam could not recover for nuisance); Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 93 Wash. 171, 178, 160 P.
299, 302 (1916) (general statutory authority to operate a garbage disposal plant barred
suit in tort but not under a theory of inverse condemnation); see generally Note, Nui-
sance and Legislative Authorization, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 781 (1952).
52. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 331, 678 P.2d at 817.
53. Id. at 333, 678 P.2d at 817.
54. See supra note 6.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
56. See Comment, supra note 6 at 623-24 (1963); Comment, Inverse Condemnation
in Washington State: A Survey of Judicial History Defining Public Rights in Property,
16 GoNz. L. Rav., 385, 409-13 (1981); see also Peterson v. King County, 41 Wash. 2d 907,
915 252 P.2d 797, 801 (1953) (A landowner's property was damaged when the county
failed to properly maintain a bulkhead that was installed adjacent to a county road. The
court held that eminent domain principles did not apply because the bulkhead was
intended to protect property owners and not for the maintenance and operation of the
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ment was necessary, inverse condemnation principles applied; if
not, the conduct was tortious.
For example, in Boitano v. Snohomish County,51 the county
had diverted water over a property owner's land after a spring
was discovered during excavation of a public gravel pit. The
court found that the diversion was necessary to the operation
and maintenance of the gravel pit, so eminent domain principles
applied.5 8 In contrast, in Peterson v. King County,59 a land-
owner's property was damaged when the county failed to prop-
erly maintain a bulkhead that was installed adjacent to a county
road. The court held that nuisance principles applied because
the bulkhead was intended to protect property owners and not
to maintain and operate the public road. 0 The court's character-
ization of the purpose of the activity as benefiting either the
municipality or the property owner thus determined the resolu-
tion of the issue of whether the conduct was "necessary." 1
Several cases with facts nearly identical to those in Miotke
have been analyzed under the prior test and held to constitute
inverse condemnation takings. In Snavely v. Goldendale,3 the
owners of dairy land downstream from a municipal sewage out-
fall sued a municipality for the pollution of a stream. The dis-
charge of raw sewage polluted the water, "rendering it unfit for
domestic use and deleterious to health. '63 The court concluded
that "[wihile polluting a stream is generally held to be tor-
tious, . . . it may assume the character of a taking or damaging
of property in contemplation of the constitutional generosity
when a municipal corporation does it on such a scale as to create
a public nuisance. '64 These types of cases, the Snavely court
public road.); Boitano v. Snohomish County, 11 Wash. 2d 664, 671-74, 120 P.2d 490, 493-
94 (1941) (The diversion of water over the plaintiff's property from a spring discovered
while excavating a public gravel pit was a necessary part of the operation and mainte-
nance of the gravel pit, so eminent domain principles applied.); Snavely v. Goldendale,
10 Wash. 2d 453, 457-58, 117 P.2d 221, 223 (1941) (In a case with facts nearly identical to
Miotke, the court held that the discharge of sewage into a river in conjunction with the
maintenance and operation of a sewage treatment system raised a taking cause of
action.).
57. 11 Wash. 2d 664, 120 P.2d 490 (1941).
58. Id. at 668, 120 P.2d at 493.
59. 41 Wash. 2d 907, 252 P.2d 797 (1953).
60. Id. at 915, 252 P.2d at 801.
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Olson v. King County, 71
Wash. 2d 279, 284-85, 428 P.2d 562, 567 (1967).
62. 10 Wash. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941).
63. Id. at 454-55, 117 P.2d at 222.
64. Id. at 455-56, 117 P.2d at 222 (citations omitted).
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held, constitute inverse condemnation because the damage is
"necessary" to the maintenance of the disposal plants. 5
Similarly, in Walla Walla v. Conkley"6 , the court of appeals
explicitly reaffirmed a land owner's right to assert a constitu-
tional taking or damaging for the disposal of sewage that causes
pollution of a stream. 7 In Conkley, property owners sued the
City of Walla Walla for damages resulting from the discharge of
pollutants into a stream traversing the plaintiff's property. The
court found that the pollution prevented all social activity on
the land for a portion of each year and made irrigation sprin-
klers unusable.6 8 The court specifically upheld inverse condem-
nation as the appropriate theory for recovery, even though the
interference was likely to be temporary. 69
Rather than rely upon the prior test, the court in Miotke
employed a "permanence of the interference" test.70 The court
rejected the defendants' contention that the Conkley analysis
controlled, suggesting that Conkley and similar cases repre-
sented situations where the interference was permanent or long
term, rather than temporary.7 ' The court quoted Northern
Pacific Railway v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District7' as a
statement of the applicable rule:
Plaintiff cites many cases holding that an invasion of pri-
vate lands constitutes an unconstitutional taking. These cases,
however, almost uniformly involve permanent or recurring
damage inherent in some plan of work. The major decisions of
this court considering the difficult distinction between a consti-
tutional taking . . . and a mere tortious interference, are in
agreement that a constitutional taking is a permanent (or
recurring) invasion of private property."
Thus, because the results of the bypass were temporary, there
65. Id. at 456-57, 117 P.2d at 222-23.
66. 6 Wash. App. 6, 492 P.2d 589 (1971).
67. Id. at 11, 492 P.2d at 592. See text accompanying note 64.
68. Id. at 10, 492 P.2d at 592.
69. Id. at 14-15, 492 P.2d at 594.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37; see also Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp.,
40 Wash. App. 802, 816, 701 P.2d 518, 527 (1985) (court cited Miotke for this test but
also suggested that the element of planned action was necessary).
71. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333-34, 678 P.2d at 818.
72. 85 Wash. 2d 920, 540 P.2d 1387 (1975).
73. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 334, 678 P.2d at 818 (quoting Northern Pacific Railway
v. Sunnyside Vly. Irrig. Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 920, 924, 540 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1975)).
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was no constitutional taking.7'
This "permanence of the interference" test originated in
Northern Pacific Railway, in which the court cited several
"major decisions"'75 as authority for the test.7 The cases cited in
Northern Pacific Railway, however, do not directly support the
test," and a careful review of the issues and holdings in the
cases suggests an ulterior motive.78  Certainly the Northern
Pacific Railway decision was a break from prior law that looked
to the public necessity of the injurous act,7 9 and the Miotke
court should have dismissed Northern Pacific Railway as an
anomoly.
The current test is problematic for several reasons. First,
the court's determination of whether the interference is tempo-
rary or permanent is imprecise and thus subject to substantial
74. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 334, 678 P.2d at 818.
75. 85 Wash. 2d at 924, 540 P.2d at 1390 (citing Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle, 143 Wash.
479, 255 P. 645 (1927); Boitano v. Snohomish County, 11 Wash. 2d 664, 120 P.2d 490
(1941); Olson v. King County, 71 Wash. 2d 279, 428 P.2d 562 (1967)).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
77. Each of the cases cited cannot be relied upon as establishing the "permanence of
the interference" test. In Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle, 143 Wash. 479, 255 P. 645 (1927), the
court applied tort law instead of inverse condemnation, where a property owner suffered
slide damage to land caused by the city's removal of lateral support. The court did not
adopt a "permanence" test but instead looked at the relationship between the purpose of
the conduct and the injury. "[The] constitution was never intended to apply to conse-
quential or resultant damages not anticipated in, nor a part of, the plan of a public
work." Id. at 490, 141 P. at 649 (quoting Jorguson v. Seattle, 80 Wash. 126, 141 P. 334
(1914)). The Wong Kee Jun decision appeared to rely on the lack of a plan that included
the interference, rather than the permanence of the injury.
In Boitano v. Snohomish County, 11 Wash. 2d 664, 120 P.2d 490 (1941), the court
found a constitutional taking where the county caused water to flow onto the plaintiff's
land when the interference was necessary to the operation and maintenance of public
property. Id. at 668, 120 P.2d at 492. The court did not rely upon a permanence of the
interference analysis.
In Olson v. King County, 71 Wash. 2d 279, 428 P.2d 562 (1967), the court denied a
taking claim when debris was cast upon an owner's land because of the County's negli-
gence in maintaining a road culvert. In denying the claim of a constitutional taking, the
court relied on a finding that the invasion neither was contemplated by the plan nor was
necessary to the building or maintenance of the road. The court did not rely on the
permanence of the invasion. Id. at 285, 428 P.2d at 567.
78. A vigorous dissent by Justice Rosellini disputed the "permanence" test and
questioned the majority's underlying reason for the holding. He stated: "[I1n attaching
so much importance to the niceties of theory, I fear the court has not paid sufficient
attention to the question of justice between the parties. Observing the fastidious mood of
the majority, I suspect some flaw would have been found in the plaintiff's case regardless
of the doctrine upon which it relied." Northern Pac. Ry. v. Sunnyside Irrig. Dist., 85
Wash. 2d at 925, 540 P.2d at 1391. (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
79. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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judicial manipulation. The supreme court has never adequately
defined the term "permanent"; 0 a judge's freedom to character-
ize an injury as either temporary or permanent could allow the
judge to dictate the result of the suit. For example, in instances
such as Miotke, landowners do not want their claim to be
brought within the "taking" clause because under current "tak-
ing" damages theory, recovery will be allowed only for the
decline in the market value of their property."' This limitation
would, in effect, bar recovery for substantial interference with
the use and enjoyment of land when the market value of the
property did not decline. 2 In these situations, courts would be
inclined to characterize the interference as temporary in order to
permit the expanded damages available under a nuisance
claim.8 3
The Miotke case almost provided another example of a
court that would be tempted to characterize the interference as
"permanent" or "recurring." Washington law requires that a
claim for damages arising from tortious conduct by the state or a
subdivision be made to an administrative body before suit com-
80. The court has not addressed the question of what period of time must elapse
before an unrestored condition is considered permanent, although the court has said that
damages are permanent if the property cannot be restored to its original condition.
Northern Pac. Ry., 85 Wash. 2d at 924, 540 P.2d at 1390 (citing Collella v. King County,
72 Wash. 2d 386, 433 P.2d 154 (1967)).
81. Normally, damages for inverse condemnation or eminent domain are limited to
payment for the loss in market value or rental value of the property in question. Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 318-19, 391 P.2d 540, 547 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 989 (1965) (landowner claiming compensation for injuries caused by aircraft flights
into a municipal airport). But see Highline School Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87
Wash. 2d 6, 13 n.5, 548 P.2d 1085, 1090 n.5 (1976) (suggesting that recovery under emi-
nent domain theory should provide full and fair compensation for loss of property rights
and should not be limited to a restrictive market value analysis).
82. This is exactly the situation that existed in Miotke. The Miotke majority, in
fact, stated that this limitation was the only reason for the defendants' argument that
eminent domain principles should apply.
[T]hese rules, the defendant city argues, limit damages to the extent to which
the market value of plaintiffs' property was impaired by the acts of the defend-
ants. (This argument is advanced apparently because the record contains
undisputed testimony that property values on Long Lake have been consist-
ently increasing since 1973. Damages under a market value theory would there-
fore be nominal at best.).
Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333, 678 P.2d at 818.
83. Damages under nuisance are available for "sickness, suffering, mental anguish,
and bodily infirmities resulting from nuisance, in addition to property damage." Miotke,
101 Wash. 2d at 332, 678 P.2d at 817 (citing Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45
Wash. 2d 346, 353, 274 P.2d 574, 578 (1954). Compare with supra note 81.
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mences.8' Failure to file this claim could lead to the dismissal of
the case unless, as in Miotke, the court were to find that this
defense had been waived.85 A sympathetic court could avoid this
obstacle to recovery by characterizing the interference as "per-
manent" or "recurring" because constitutional claims of "tak-
ings" have no administrative filing requirements.8 1
B. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Rather than follow the permanence of the interference
approach, the Washington Supreme Court could return to a
modified version of the prior analysis: whether the act was nec-
essary for a public use.87 The prior test was more logical because
determination that a "taking" or "damaging" has occurred
should depend upon the nature of the entity's action and not
upon the type or longevity of the injury inflicted. Nonpermanent
takings or damages should be held compensable under the state
constitution.8 Washington courts previously have found tempo-
rary constitutional takings or damagings, 9 and this approach
has been recognized by other states under their constitutions. °
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has intimated
that nonpermanent takings are compensable under the taking
clause of the federal constitution in the regulatory setting.9 1
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.110 (1985) provides: "No action shall be commenced
against the state for damages arising out of tortious conduct until a claim has first been
presented to and filed with the director of financial management .... " WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.96.010 (1985) provides a similar requirement for claims against a political sub-
division of the state.
85. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333, 678 P.2d at 817.
86. Constitutional takings under WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, amend. IX are not tor-
tious acts and are thus not subject to filing requirements. See supra note 84; Olson v.
King County, 71 Wash. 2d 279, 284, 428 P.2d 562, 567 (1967) (court recognized that a
failure by a plaintiff to timely file a claim might influence a court to find a constitutional
taking where it might otherwise apply tort law).
87. See supra text accompanying note 56.
88. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 16, amend. IX reads in part: "No private property shall be
taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first
made . . . ." (emphasis added).
89. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 920, 926-27, 540
P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (1975) (J. Rosellini, dissenting) (citing numerous cases).
90. See Sherr v. Evesham TP, 184 N.J. Super. L. 11, 62, 445 A.2d 46, 73 (1982); Zinn
v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 334 N.W. 2d 67, 72 (1983).
91. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The City of San Diego rezoned part of a piece of property, changing it from
industrial to agriculture, and designated it open space. The property owner sued, claim-
ing a constitutional taking. The majority by a 5 to 4 vote did not reach the merits of the
case because it held that no final judgment had been rendered by the state court. Justice
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The frequently cited dissent of Justice Brennan in San
Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. San Diego9" speaks to the issue of
temporary regulatory takings and appears to express the opinion
of the Court that temporary takings are compensable takings
within the Just Compensation Clause of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution.
The fact that a "taking" may be temporary, by virtue of
the government's power to rescind or omit the regulation, does
not make it any less of a constitutional "taking". Nothing in
the Just Compensation Clause suggests that "takings" must be
permanent and irrevocable. Nor does the temporary reversible
quality of a . . . regulatory "taking" render compensation for
the time of "taking" any less obligatory. This Court more than
once has recognized that temporary reversible "takings" should
be analyzed according to the same constitutional framework
applied to permanent irreversible "takings.""3
According to the San Diego dissent, any government action that
"destroy[s] the use and enjoyment of property in order to pro-
mote the public good" is a "taking" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.9 4 Justice Brennan said:
It is only logical, then, that government action other than
acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a
"taking," and therefore a defacto exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain, where the effects completely deprive the owner of
all or most of his interest in the property. 5
Property rights are divisible and the taking of one of those
rights-temporarily or permanently-by a sovereign body
should entitle the property owner to a constitutionally-based
recovery.9 6 The Washington Supreme Court previously has
stated that "property in a thing consists not merely in its owner-
Rehnquist, who voted with the majority, although in a concurring opinion, stated that he
would have agreed with the dissent, absent the final judgment question. It has been said
that "the Washington constitution affords a broader base for protecting property rights
than does the federal constitution. . . ." Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washing-
ton-Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box?, 39 WASH. L. REv. 920, 929 (1965).
92. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 657.
94. Id. at 652.
95. Id. at 653.
96. The Washington court has held that this provision should be liberally construed
in favor of private property owners. King County v. Seattle Cedar Lumber Mfg. Co., 94
Wash. 84, 90, 162 P. 27, 30 (1916).
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ship and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoy-
ment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these ele-
ments of the property, to that extent destroys the property
itself. '97 Washington's constitutional provision was intended to
protect all essential elements of ownership that make property
valuable,"s and use of property is one such element.
In conjunction with adopting the concept of temporary tak-
ings, the Washington court would have to expand the currently
recognized limit on damages." An expanded "taking" theory, as
suggested here, would require that compensation be awarded for
the loss of use and enjoyment of the property, regardless of the
effect on market value. 10 0 Recovery thus would be provided for
actual damages sustained and for the loss of use estimated by
the imputed rental value over the period of the interference. 10
97. In re Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 652, 656, 504 P.2d 292, 294, (1972) (emphasis deleted)
(citing Span v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 355, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (1921). In In re Seattle
the court held that a property owner is entitled to interest on a court-determined com-
pensation award in lieu of damages for interference by the condemnor with the
unrestricted right of use of a condemnee's property. See also Comment, supra note 56, at
385-87.
98. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 351, 173 P. 40, 42 (1918)
Among these elements is fundamentally the right of user . . . . A physical
interference with the land which substantially obstructs this right, takes the
plaintiff's property to just so great an extent as it is thereby deprived of its
right. To deprive one of the use of his property is to deprive him of his prop-
erty; and the private injury is thereby as completely effected as if the property
itself were physically taken. Accordingly, it has been held that any use of land
for a public purpose, which inflicts an injury upon adjacent land such as would
have been actionable if caused by a private owner, is a taking or damaging
within the meaning of the constitution.
Id. at 351-52, 173 P. at 42. See also Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 590, 547 P.2d 282,
285 (1976) (stating that the constitution was intended to protect all essential elements of
ownership which make property valuable).
99. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
100. Although the Miotke court appeared to accept at face value the defendants'
assertion that taking damages are limited to the reduction in market value of the prop-
erty, see supra note 81, the court on several occasions has suggested a broader grant of
damages. In Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976), the court stated that
"[ilt is well established that the condemnee is entitled to be put in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied had his property not been taken." Id. at 589, 547
P.2d at 285. See also Papac v. Montesano, 49 Wash. 2d 484, 303 P.2d 654 (1956) (in
temporary damage cases, the measure of damages generally is the cost of reconstruction,
with compensation for loss of use in proper cases); Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 49 Wash.
2d 578, 304 P.2d 705 (1956) (measure of compensation for taking or damaging of land for
public use is dependent upon the nature of the injury, whether it is permanent or
temporary).
101. The substitution of the constitutionally based inverse condemnation theory for
the nuisance application would not affect potential recovery for additional damages
under other tort theories such as the negligent infliction of emotional distress, which was
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The mere expansion of the "taking or damaging" claim to
include temporary takings does not solve the problem of distin-
guishing instances of eminent domain from tort. The problem
could be solved if the court would reassert its method of analyz-
ing the nature of the injurious act. As stated, property necessary
to the taking or maintenance of property for public use is, if
damaged, done so for public use and thus falls within the ambit
of inverse condemnation.10 2 If the injurious action is necessary to
public use, then the property owner must be compensated for
that purpose under inverse condemnation. This rule is not with-
out difficulties,' 03 but the use of common sense in determining
whether an injurious act was necessary to a public purpose or
property is an appropriate method by which to distinguish
inverse condemnation from tort.
IV. REMAINING ISSUES
A. Nuisance
Because the Miotke majority felt constrained by, or simply
chose to follow, the "permanence of the interference" test, °  it
rejected the defendants' inverse condemnation theory and
turned to tort.'0 5 The court held that Washington's statutory
nuisance provision created a private right of action not directly
provided by the environmental statutes.'06
By one reading of the decision, although not the only read-
ing,'0 7 the court interpreted the statutory nuisance provision to
exclude an "unreasonableness" requirement that previously had
been read into the statute. 08 According to the court, the statute
consists of a two-part test that requires only (1) an unlawful
awarded in Miotke.
102. See supra text accompanying note 56.
103. One difficulty identified with the prior test is the uncertainty involved in defin-
ing an act that is "necessary" to a public use. See supra text accompanying notes 56-69.
However, a solution to the interpretation problems associated with this ambiguous term
is to define "necessary" as requiring only a coincidental relationship to the public use
benefited. Such a broad interpretation would conform to the courts previously enunci-
ated interpretations. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Comment,
supra note 6, at 623-24.
104. See supra text accompanying 70-74.
105. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 332, 678 P.2d at 818.
106. Id. at 330, 678 P.2d at 816.
107. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
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act 0  that (2) "essentially interfere[s] with the comfortable
enjoyment of the life and property of the plaintiffs";'1 0 tradi-
tional nuisance law, in contrast, requires both a substantial and
an unreasonable interference with property."'
Courts in general, and Washington courts in particular,
have long recognized that reasonable interferences are the price
that citizens pay for living in an organized society, even when
the interferences result in substantial injury." 2 Although courts
differ in their definitions of substantial and unreasonable inter-
ference, a substantial interference generally is one where there is
significant injury, and an unreasonable interference is one where
society determines that it would be unfair to allow the defend-
ant to cause such an amount of harm without compensating the
plaintiff."3
The Washington Supreme Court generally has followed
traditional nuisance analysis and rejected the strict reading of
the nuisance statutes when it has interpreted the requirements
for nuisances. Washington's fundamental inquiry for nuisance
analysis has traditionally required a balancing of the rights,
interests, and convenience of the parties.' 1 ' In using this balanc-
ing approach, Washington courts have gone even further than
most other courts and weighed the social utility of the interfer-
ing use against the gravity of the harm done to the landowner.'15
In several previous decisions, the Washington Supreme Court
has recognized the need to look at all the circumstances and
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120 (1985) requires "unlawfully doing any act" but*
does not specify the type of legal requirement that must be violated. In Miotke, the
court found a violation of the Waste Discharge Permit requirement and WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 90.48 (1985). Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 331, 678 P.2d at 815. It is unclear
whether the mere violation of a regulatory action would constitute an unlawful act as
required by § 7.48.120.
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.010 (1985).
111. "The law does not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty
annoyances and disturbances of everyday life in a civilized community even from con-
duct committed with knowledge that annoyance and inconvenience will result." W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 88 (5th ed. 1984).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 248, 254-55, 248 P.2d 380,
382-83 (1952); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 19, 129 P.2d 536,
539 (1942).
115. See Jones v. Ramford, 64 Wash. 2d 559, 562-63, 392 P.2d 808, 810 (1964); State
v. Stubblefield, 36 Wash. 2d 664, 671, 220 P.2d 305, 309 (1950); Harden v. Olympic Port-
land Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 325, 154 P. 450, 451 (1916); Densmore v. Evergreen
Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 61 Wash. 230, 235-36, 112 P. 255, 257 (1910).
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interests applicable to a "nuisance in fact" determination.11 6
It is possible that the Miotke court proceeded under an
unarticulated assumption that the interference in Miotke met an
"unreasonableness" standard, ' 17 or that the unlawful nature of
the act 1 5 constituted a per se finding of unreasonableness. 1 9 If
the court proceeded under the assumption that the interference
was unreasonable and, therefore, that the plaintiffs should be
compensated, the defendants deserved to have this conclusion
articulated because the reasonableness of the interference was
subject to dispute.1 20 If, instead, the "unlawful act" prong of the
court's two-part nuisance test1 21 replaced the traditional require-
ment of an unreasonable interference, and if even a reasonable
interference will support recovery, the court deviated from prior
nuisance statute interpretation. The court's interest in compen-
sating the plaintiffs, however, may have called for this new
approach.
The court may have used the nuisance statute as a mere
vehicle to provide the plaintiffs with a private remedy for the
violation of various environmental statutes that provide no such
right.1 2  The tortious conduct satisfying the nuisance statute's
unlawful act requirement thus could simply be the violation of
an environmental statute. If the court had this purpose in mind,
then the apparent exclusion of an "unreasonableness" analysis is
more understandable and excusable.'2 8 Unfortunately, the court
was not explicit, so we must await future cases for an indication
of what the court really intended.
B. SEPA-Based Tort
Of the remaining questions before the court,12 4 the most
116. Nuisances other than those termed per se are called nuisances in fact, Harden,
89 Wash. at 325, 154 P. at 451, or nuisances per accidents, Stubblefield, 36 Wash. 2d at
671, 220 P.2d at 309, for which the general reasonableness analysis applies. The circum-
stances and interests include (1) character of the neighborhood, (2) sequence of events,
(3) capacity to control objectionable effect, and (4) public interests on use. Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REV. 47, 71-75 (1970).
117. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 42.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
122. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 336, 678 P.2d at 816.
123. Unreasonableness, in this case, is conclusively presumed by virtue of the unlaw-
fulness of the act.
124. The court addressed three additional issues in the case. First, the court denied
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interesting and possibly most significant holding was the denial
of the plaintiffs' request for additional tort damages based upon
SEPA. 12 5 Although the court rejected the plaintiff's "novel the-
ory,''1 6 it did leave the door open for adopting this theory in the
the defendants' claim that the City was immune from prosecution because the dumping
was a discretionary act by government officials which fell within an exception to this
state's statutory abolition of sovereign immunity. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 336-37, 678
P.2d at 819-20; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1985). The court determined that the action
failed two parts of the four-part test for immunity that the court had adopted in Evan-
gelical United Bretheren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). The
dumping did not "require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise
on the part of the governmental agency involved," and, additionally, "the governmental
agency involved [did not] possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful
authority and duty to do or make the challeged act, omission, or decision." Id. at 255,
407 P.2d at 445.
Second, the court denied defendants' claim that plaintiffs were barred by their fail-
ure to file a claim for damages as required by WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.110 (1985), which
provides:
No action shall be commenced against the state for damages arising out of
tortious conduct until a claim has first been presented to and filed with the
director of financial management. The requirements of this section shall not
affect the applicable period of limitations within which an action must be com-
menced, but such period shall begin and shall continue to run as if no claim
were required.
The court held that the defendants had waived their rights to assert the defense because
they waited until three years after the commencement of the action to assert it. Miotke,
101 Wash. 2d at 337, 678 P.2d at 820.
Third, the trial court's award of attorney fees for the injunctive phase of the litiga-
tion was upheld because there was no constitutional majority voting against the award.
Justice Pearson, writing for the court and joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justice
Stafford, would have affirmed the trial court award of attorney's fees based upon the
dicta supporting the private attorney general theory as set out in PUD v. Kottsick, 86
Wash. 2d 388, 392, 545 P.2d 1, 4 (1976), where it was said: "Simply stated, this doctrine
provides that a private attorney general may be awarded attorney fees whenever the
successful litigant (1) incurs considerable economic expense, (2) to effectuate an impor-
tant legislative policy, (3) which benefits a large class of people." Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d
at 339-40, 678 P.2d at 822-23.
The court has never adopted this exception to the general rule prohibiting attorney
fee awards, but it applied the Kottsick requirements in Miotke and found: (1) a consid-
erable economic expense; (2) the injunction effectuated the important legislative policy
of SEPA and other environmental legislation; and (3) the prevention of further discharge
protected all those who live, work, and play along the river. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 341,
678 P.2d at 822. Justice Dolliver, with Justices Utter, Brachtenbach, and Dimmick, con-
curring, argued that the facts of the case failed to meet any of the Kottsick dicta require-
ments. Id. at 342-43, 678 P.2d at 822. They believed that (1) the statutes were intended
to serve the public-at-large and not a large class of people; (2) there was no special
important legislative policy served by the litigation; and (3) $8,850 per family is not a
considerable expense. Id. J. Dolliver stated that he disapproved of the private attorney
general theory under any circumstances. Id. at 343, 678 P.2d at 823.
125. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1985); Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333, 678 P.2d at
126. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333. 678 P.2d at 817.
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future. According to the court, there was no need to adopt a new
tort when "adequate damages [were] available under established
theories." 2 '
The plaintiffs' theory based recovery on a violation of a
"fundamental and inalienable" right to a healthful environment,
which is guaranteed by the SEPA preamble, sounding in tort. L2 8
Although the court declined to adopt the proposed tort, it
implied that it would recognize such a cause of action in the
future if existing doctrines provided no remedy.12
C. Recovery Under a SEPA-Based Tort
Given the court's reasoning and holding in Miotke and the
precedents that the court drew upon and reaffirmed, there is at
least one set of facts that suggests a situation where the court
might resort to a SEPA-based tort. This situation can be illus-
trated by changing the Miotke facts slightly and hypothesizing
that the City complied with the Water Pollution Control Act,
the waste discharge permit requirement, and the other breached
environmental statutes. 30 Under such circumstances, current
law would preclude the plaintiffs from asserting an inverse con-
demnation claim for the same reason that the court denied it in
Miotke: the injury was temporary, not permanent.' In addi-
tion, plaintiffs' claim under nuisance law would fail because
"nothing can be a nuisance that is done or maintained under
express authority of a statute.""' 2 Because the defendants would
have acted under general authority of statute and regulation,
this statutory nuisance defense would prevent nuisance
recovery."' s
127. Id.
128. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.020 (1985). "(3) The legislature recognizes that each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each
person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment."
129. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 333, 678 P.2d at 817.
130. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
131. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 334, 678 P.2d at 818. See also supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
132. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.48.160 (1985).
133. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. But see Comment, supra note
116, at 68 n.96, which argues that the court should probably construe this statute more
strictly in private nuisance cases when governmental entities are defendants because the
legislature has declared such entities to be liable for their torts; see also Bruskland v.
Oak Theater, Inc., 42 Wash. 2d 346, 350-51, 254 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1953) (court indicated,
in dicta, that it might strictly construe the statute in the future).
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Because the property owners suffered such an obnoxious
interference with their right to use their property, however, a
court is likely to fashion a remedy.'" Unless the court modifies
or distinguishes existing precedent under inverse condemnation
or nuisance theories, it might recognize a new SEPA-based tort.
The Miotke court naturally was reluctant to adopt a new cause
of action because recovery did not depend upon it.
If the court were to adopt a theory based on the broad lan-
guage of the SEPA preamble, myriad issues would arise. But in
spite of the reasons counseling hesitation, Washington courts
have in the past interpreted SEPA in ways that broadly protect
the environment.1 3 5 Therefore, given the necessity of doing so,
the court might and should act to extend SEPA one step further
by adopting a SEPA-based tort. Judicial reluctance to break
new ground should give way when action is necessary to fully
compensate an injured property owner.
CONCLUSION
The Miotke court addressed several significant issues in this
rather complex case.136 The court distinguished inverse condem-
nation from tort in a new way, although the traditional test was
preferable and more likely to lead to a more expansive view of
inverse condemnation takings.1 3 7 The court's application of the
134. The Washington Supreme Court has said, "In our opinion, the theory that
property rights are ever to be sacrificed to public convenience or necessity without just
compensation is fraught with danger, and should find no lodgment in American jurispru-
dence." Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 353-54, 173 P. 40, 42 (1918).
135. [W]ashington courts... [have] infused that statute with a potency that
may have exceeded the expectations of even its most hopeful sponsors. The
courts enthusiastically accept the legislature's direction that "the policies, reg-
ulations, and laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted ... in accor-
dance with the policies set forth in this act."
R. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIBONMENTAL LAW IN WASHINGTON § 5.6 at 181
(1983).
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that "the maintenance, enhancement,
and restoration of the environment is the pronounced policy of this state, deserving
faithful judicial interpretations." Eastlake Comm. Council v. Roanoke Assoc. Inc., 82
Wash. 2d 475, 490, 513 P.2d 36, 46 (1973). As an example of the court's broad interpreta-
tion of the Act, the court has said that the Act's policy is not only to prevent environ-
mental degradation but also to restore environmental health. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Air
Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 707, 601 P.2d 501, 515 (1979). See generally SEmLE,
supra, § 5.6 at 180-83 for a discussion of Washington courts' broad interpretation of
SEPA.
136. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d at 311, 678 P.2d at 805.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
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nuisance statute to the facts in Miotke raises several unan-
swered questions, and the court failed to adequately articulate
its analysis. However, the court did appear to make clear its
desire to increase the availability of remedies to environmental
litigants. 3 8
Finally, the court considered a tort premised upon the pre-
amble of SEPA.'39 The equities in future cases and the deficien-
cies of the common law may yet lead the court, in search of jus-
tice and in furtherance of state objectives, to grant a cause of
action based upon this theory.
Gary L. Baker
138. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
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